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1 
The Victims of Hate Crime and the Principles of the Criminal Law 
1. Abstract
There is an ongoing debate amongst hate crime scholars about the categories of victims which should be included 
within hate crime legislation.  Some commentators argue that affording protection to groups based on pre-defined 
characteristics results in many victims being excluded from the legislation.  They would prefer a more inclusive 
approach which would offer protection to a potentially limitless number of groups. This paper considers the question 
from a doctrinal perspective, and argues that a principled way of deciding the characteristics of hate crime is 
required.  It will conclude that the core concern of hate crime legislation is with the furthering of the broader 
equality agenda and, as such, the victims of hate crime should form an exclusive group based on those 
characteristics protected under equality legislation.  This approach can help provide a theoretical framework for 
hate crime legislation which can be more easily accommodated within criminal law principles. 
2. Introduction
The term ‘hate crime’ does not have a specific legal meaning, but has been used flexibly to 
describe any legislation or legal response aimed at punishing criminal behaviour which 
demonstrates either hatred, or hostility or bias towards a particular group in society.  In this 
paper, hate crime will be used to refer to the offences encompassed by three main pieces of 
legislation:  the aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the stirring up 
offences under the Public Order Act 1986, and the enhanced sentencing provisions under the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
Under sections 28-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (hereafter, ‘CDA’), an 
aggravated offence is committed when a defendant demonstrates or was motivated by hostility 
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towards a person on the grounds of race and religion1 in the course of committing a ‘basic 
offence’ such as assault or criminal damage.2  The aggravated offence attracts a higher penalty 
than the basic offence.3     
The stirring up offences under the Public Order Act 1986 (hereafter ‘POA’) have a long 
history4 rooted in anti-discrimination legislation, but in their current form they seek to 
criminalise behaviour which is threatening, abusive or insulting where there is an intention to 
thereby stir up racial hatred, or, having regard to all the circumstances, racial hatred was likely to 
be stirred up thereby.5  These offences were extended in 2007 to include the stirring up of 
religious hatred, and in 2010, a further extension was implemented to include sexual 
orientation, thus incorporating a characteristic not currently present under the CDA.6 
The most extensive classification of characteristics can be found under s. 145 and s. 146 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (hereafter ‘CJA’), which requires sentencing judges to take 
account of hostility on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or 
transgender identity as an aggravating factor in sentencing.  This requirement applies to 
sentencing for all crimes, and is not limited to a small number of offences as is the case under 
the CDA.  However, unlike the CDA, the aggravation cannot result in a sentence that is higher 
than the ordinary statutory maximum, and the fact of aggravation does not appear in the name 
of the offence for which the offender has been found guilty.   
                                                          
1 Aggravated offences in relation to racial hostility were enacted under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, ss 28-32, 
and racially aggravated offences were added by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 39.   
2 The other basic offences are certain public order offences involving threatening, abusive or insulting conduct, 
harassment or stalking and putting people in fear of violence.   
3 For example, the maximum for the basic offence of s. 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is 5 years, 
but this is increased to 7 years under the CDA.- Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 29(2)(b). 
4 See for instance, G Schaffer, ‘Legislating against Hatred:  Meaning and Motive in Section Six of the Race Relations 
Act of 1965’ (2014) 25 Twentieth Century British History and I Hare, ‘Legislating Against Hate – The Legal Response to 
Bias Crimes’ (1997) 17 OJLS 415. 
5 There are several types of behaviour that fall into this category, including the possession, display, publication or 
distribution of written material or visual images or sound, or presenting or directing the public performance of a 
play - Public Order Act 1986, ss 18-22. 
6 The offences were extended to ‘religion’ by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, and to ‘sexual orientation’ 
by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
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Although the umbrella term ‘hate crime’ is used to refer to these provisions, they were 
enacted at separate times, and have developed discretely and independently of each other.  The 
variation in the type of characteristics which are included in the different pieces of legislation 
reflects the organic way in which hate crime law has developed over the last two decades.  In 
2013, the Ministry of Justice invited the Law Commission to reflect on this disparity and asked 
them to consider the case for extending the CDA and POA offences to bring them into line with 
the characteristics currently covered by the CJA.7  This desire to extend the characteristics of 
hate crime forms part of the Government’s Hate Crime agenda8, and so, therefore, is clearly 
policy based.  However, although such policy-driven proposals are an inevitable characteristic of 
law reform, the case for extension needs to be grounded in a more principled rationale which can 
provide a framework for identifying which groups should be covered by hate crime legislation.  
The decision to extend hate crime provisions needs to be founded on a clear justification which 
gives due regard to the theoretical underpinnings of the criminal law, and must correlate with the 
function and purpose of hate crime legislation.   
The need for a principled approach becomes apparent when we consider the number of 
different groups that could potentially be given protection under the legislation.  Within the hate 
crime community, there is an ongoing debate about which victims should be covered by hate 
crime statutes. 9  Although the type of victim included in hate crime legislation across the world 
varies according to the particular needs of each jurisdiction,10 there is a consensus around race, 
                                                          
7 For details and analysis of the Law Commission’s recommendations see C Bakalis, ‘Legislating Against Hatred:  
The Law Commission’s Report on Hate Crime’ (2015) Crim LR 177. 
8 Details of the Action Plan can be found at:  <www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crime-action-plan-
challenge-it-report-it-stop-it> accessed 15 January 2016. 
9 See for example: M Blake, ‘Geeks and monsters: Bias crimes and social identity’ (2001) 20 Law and 
Philosophy 121; R Grattet and V Jenness, ‘Examining the Boundaries of Hate Crime Law: Disabilities and the 
“Dilemma of Difference”’ in B Perry (ed.), Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader (Routledge, 2003) 284; N Chakraborti and J 
Garland, ‘Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and “difference”’ (2012) 16 
Theoretical Criminology 499; J Schweppe ‘Defining characteristics and politicizing victims: A legal perspective’ 
(2012) 10 Journal of Hate Studies 173; M Al-Hakim, ‘Making a home for the Homeless in Hate Crime Legislation’ 
(2014) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1; G Mason, ‘Victim attributes in hate crime law: Difference and the 
politics of justice’ (2014) 54 British Journal of Criminology 161.  See also F M Lawrence Punishing Hate:  Bias Crimes 
Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999) 11-20. 
10 For examples see OSCE/ODIHR ‘Hate Crime Laws:  A Practical Guide’ (2009) 37, 38. 
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national origin, ethnicity and religion, and to a lesser extent sexual orientation, age, gender and 
disability.11  However, it is clear that in spite of the agreement on this core, there is scope for 
extending beyond this to include characteristics such as ‘personal appearance’12 or ‘any social 
group’13.  Some jurisdictions, such as Spain and Croatia have more open-ended definitions of 
protected characteristics by incorporating a level of flexibility within the legislation which permits 
judges to extend the categories as they see fit.14   
This disagreement over the selection of victims has led some commentators to criticise 
the standard approach (which identifies victims by their characteristics) because it creates 
‘hierarchies of hate’.15  This occurs because, typically, only those groups with the ability to 
mobilise and organise themselves to achieve the necessary political clout to ensure inclusion in 
hate crime legislation are afforded the extra protection and attention which recognition in hate 
crime statutes provides.  Chakraborti and Garland have argued that instead of putting identity 
and group membership at the heart of hate crimes, we should instead be focusing on the 
‘vulnerability’ of victims, and the problems of ‘difference’.16  By contrast, Al-Hakim is wary of 
using ‘vulnerability’ as a basis for allocating hate crime protection because he believes it 
emphasises the weakness or helplessness of the victim, and so he would favour an approach 
based on ‘disadvantage’ as that would better capture the moral wrong at the heart of hate 
crimes.17  Schweppe is also in favour of a more open definition for the victims of hate crime and 
recommends the jury should be given discretion to convict defendants whenever it can be shown 
that they exhibited hostility towards a victim because of their personal characteristics which they 
                                                          
11 For examples see OSCE/ODIHR ‘Hate Crime Laws:  A Practical Guide’ (2009) 37, 40. 
12 Under section 22-3701 of the District of Columbia Code. 
13 Under Article 63 of the Russian Criminal Code. 
14 OSCE/ODIHR ‘Hate Crime Laws:  A Practical Guide’ (2009) 46. 
15 N Chakraborti and J Garland, ‘Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and 
“difference”’ (2012) 16 Theoretical Criminology 499, 499. 
16 N Chakraborti and J Garland, ‘Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and 
“difference”’ (2012) 16 Theoretical Criminology 499. 




share with an identifiable social group.18  This will be referred to as ‘group hostility’. These 
approaches would effectively make it possible for a large, if not limitless, number of groups to 
find protection under the legislation.  Other commentators, such as Mason, although broadly in 
favour of a more inclusive approach, caution against a law that sets no limits to the category of 
victim.19  By allowing such a broad category of victimhood, it has been possible in New South 
Wales for legislation to be interpreted as giving protection to paedophiles, and thus give the 
impression that the state endorses and sanctions conduct that is illegal and intolerable to 
society.20  She argues, therefore, that any extension of the characteristics of victims must be 
‘tethered to a politics of justice that limits attributes to forms of difference that have a justifiable 
claim to affirmation, equality and respect for the attribute that makes them different’.21  
It is important at the outset to recognise that this debate conflates two separate but inter-
connected issues.  The first is to do with what rationale we should adopt to decide who the 
victims of hate crime should be.  The above discussion shows that various options are possible 
such as ‘difference’ or ‘vulnerability’ or ‘group hostility’ or ‘disadvantage’ or, as will be argued in 
this article, ‘equality’.  The second issue concerns what should be done once the rationale for 
victimhood has been established – should the identities be ‘exclusive’ or ‘inclusive’?  An 
exclusive approach would require the victims (on whichever basis they have been decided) to be 
chosen in advance by legislation which names them specifically.   An inclusive approach would 
give discretion to a judge or jury to decide in each case that comes before it whether the 
particular victim fell into the general category of hate crime victimhood.  It is important to 
distinguish these two facets of the debate as it is wrong to assume that any particular rationale 
for hate crime is necessarily more inclusive than another.  For example, Chakraborti and Garland 
                                                          
18 J Schweppe ‘Defining characteristics and politicizing victims: A legal perspective’ (2012) 10 Journal of Hate 
Studies 173. 
19 G Mason, ‘Victim attributes in hate crime law: Difference and the politics of justice’ (2014) 54 British Journal of 
Criminology 161. 
20 G Mason, ‘Victim attributes in hate crime law: Difference and the politics of justice’ (2014) 54 British Journal of 
Criminology 161. 




argue in favour of ‘vulnerability’ or ‘difference’ on the basis that these are inherently more 
inclusive than the current system which specifies in advance which groups are granted hate crime 
victimhood.  However, ‘vulnerability’ or ‘difference’ as categories of hate crime are only more 
inclusive if discretion is given to judges or juries to determine in each case whether a victim 
belongs to a ‘vulnerable’ or sufficiently ‘different’ group.  ‘Vulnerability’ can potentially be just as 
exclusive as the current approach if legislators were to decide in advance which groups have a 
vulnerable enough status to be covered by hate crime legislation.  
This article aims to contribute to the first question of this debate by adopting a doctrinal 
analysis of hate crime legislation.  .The second question on ‘inclusivity’ versus ‘exclusivity’ will be 
commented on in passing, but will not form the core of this piece.  Whilst a number of 
commentators have tracked the political development of hate crime laws,22 less emphasis has 
been placed on the legal doctrinal issues.23   A doctrinal approach is necessary to ensure that the 
legislation - which has evolved as a result of a multitude of political pressures over the last fifty 
years - has a robust and compelling basis in criminal law doctrine.  The principles of the criminal 
law exist in order to give legitimacy to the actions of the state; our hate crime legislation needs to 
have a firm foundation in such principles in order to be valid exercises in state power.  This piece 
will take as its starting point basic criminal law values such as the need to identify the ‘harm’ or 
‘wrong’ at the heart of hate crime legislation and the principle of ‘minimum criminalisation’.  It 
                                                          
22 There is a rich literature on the political dimension of hate crime laws. J B Jacobs and K Potter, Hate Crimes:  
Criminal Law and Identity Politics (OUP 1998) is a good starting point.  A non-exhaustive list of other pieces includes:  
E MClaughlin, ‘Rocks and hard places:  The politics of hate crime’ (2002) 6 Theoretical Criminology 493, L Moran 
‘Affairs of the heart: Hate crime and the politics of crime control' (2001), 12 Law and Critique 331-344,  M Duggan 
and V Heap Administrating victimization: The politics of anti-social behaviour and hate crime policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 
J Garland and J Treadwell ‘The New Politics of Hate? An Assessment of the Appeal of the English Defence League Amongst 
Disadvantaged White Working Class Communities in England’ (2012) 10 Journal of Hate Studies 123. 
   
23 Notable exceptions are K Goodall, ‘Conceptualising “racism” in the Criminal Law’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 215, M 
Walters ‘’Conceptualizing 'hostility' for hate crime law: minding 'the minutiae' when interpreting section 28(1)(a) of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies pp. 47-74, A Owusu-Bempah and M Walters Racially 
aggravated offences: when does section 145 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 apply? 2016 Criminal Law Review 116, R Taylor 
‘the Role of the Aggravated Offences in Combating Hate Crime 15 Years After the Crime and Disorder Act 1998:  
Time for a Change?’ (2014) 13 Contemporary Issues in Law 76. F Brennan ‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998:  racially 
motivated crime: the response of the criminal justice system’ (1999) Criminal Law Review 17-28. 
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will show how the discussion about the appropriate parameters of hate crime legislation must 
pay heed to the underlying rationale for such laws, and to the question of how their existence can 
be justified in accordance with basic criminal law values and principles.  Hate crime laws in this 
country have their origins in provisions aimed at eliminating discrimination in order to ensure 
equality for all citizens.  The concept of equality, therefore, lies at the heart of hate crimes laws, 
and so needs to form the focus of any discussion about the extension of hate crime legislation.  
The conceptual models traditionally used to define the parameters of hate crime legislation sit 
awkwardly with deeply held criminal law principles; however, it will be argued that the principle 
of equality may provide a theoretical framework for such statutes which is more easily 
accommodated within current criminal law structures.  This will have inevitable implications for 
the category of victims which should be included in the law.  Essentially, it will be contended 
that the inextricable link between the underlying justification for hate crime and the broader 
equality agenda means that the parameters of hate crime victims should mirror the characteristics 
covered by equality legislation, and any extension beyond this will throw into doubt the 
legitimacy of hate crimes.  The article will end by discussing some of the implications of 
establishing a link between the equality agenda and hate crime legislation.   
 
3.  The Victims of Hate Crime and the Principles of the Criminal Law 
It has been argued by some, such as Blake, that the decision as to which victims to include in 
hate crime legislation is purely policy-based.24   However, the current dispute over the victims of 
hate crime suggests that the disagreement goes beyond policy, and is in fact part of a much wider 
debate about the underlying rationale for hate crime legislation.  If, for example, you take the 
view that the victims of hate crime law should include all ‘vulnerable’ groups, this suggests an 
entirely different notion about the purpose of hate crime than the view that ‘group hostility’ is 
                                                          
24 M Blake, ‘Geeks and monsters: Bias crimes and social identity’ (2001) 20 Law and Philosophy 121. 
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the core of hate crime.25 The former suggests that hate crime laws are there to protect those who 
are vulnerable in society, whereas the latter implies that the purpose of hate crime law is to 
outlaw group-based hostility.  These are fundamentally distinct conceptions of the rationale for 
hate crime legislation that cannot be dismissed as being purely policy-based, and reveal a far 
deeper schism amongst hate crime commentators.  Thus, the dispute about who the victims of 
hate crime law should be is inextricably linked to the wider debate about the proper rationale for 
hate crime law.  This section seeks to explore this question from a doctrinal perspective to 
explore whether the theoretical underpinnings of the criminal law can shed any light on the 
debate. 
The first section will identify which principles of the criminal law are most problematic 
for hate crime legislation.  The challenges posed by these principles must be overcome if a 
proposed rationale for hate crime legislation is to be deemed legitimate.  The second section will 
consider to what extent ‘vulnerability’, ‘group hatred’ and ‘disadvantage’ can meet these 
challenges.  The third section will argue that the concept of ‘equality’ is more consistent with 
these criminal law principles, and thus provides a more suitable rationale for hate crime 
legislation.    
 
(a) The Rationale for Hate Crime Legislation and the Principles of the Criminal Law 
To begin with, it is important to identify two important principles of the criminal law that pose a 
particular challenge for hate crime law.  An analysis of these principles, and how they apply to 
hate crime legislation, will demonstrate that in order for a rationale for hate crime law to be 
                                                          
25 N Chakraborti and J Garland, ‘Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and 
“difference”’ (2012)16 Theoretical Criminology 499 and J Schweppe ‘Defining characteristics and politicizing 
victims: A legal perspective’ (2012) 10 Journal of Hate Studies 173. 
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legitimate, it needs to be able to justify why hatred26 against specific groups should attract a 
greater punishment than the same offence committed without the hatred. 
First, when the state proposes the creation of a new piece of legislation, it needs to be 
demonstrated that there is a strong case in favour of using the criminal law to prohibit such 
behaviour.  Traditionally, J.S. Mill’s notion of ‘harm’ has been used as a guiding principle for 
determining the legitimacy of a proposed law.27  In general terms, this stipulates that the criminal 
law should only be used to prohibit behaviour if that behaviour can be shown to cause ‘harm’ to 
others.28  Mill’s ‘harm’ principle has been subjected to a number of criticisms and modifications 
over the years, but has had enduring appeal for many contemporary legal philosophers.29  By 
contrast, legal moralists believe that a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for 
criminalisation is that the underlying behaviour which the law aims to prohibit is morally 
‘wrong’.30  Within both schools of thought, views differ as to the essential qualities of ‘harm’ or 
‘wrongness’,31 but for our purposes, what this debate demonstrates is the need to articulate 
clearly the underlying ‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ which legislation seeks to outlaw.32   
The second principle which needs to be examined is that of ‘minimum criminalisation’.33  
The ‘minimalist’ approach to the criminal law requires that certain limits are imposed on the 
                                                          
26 The term ‘hatred’ is used in this article although it is acknowledged that the CDA offences use the word ‘hostility’.   
27 J S Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (OUP, 1991). 
28 J S Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (OUP, 1991) 14. 
29 A number of modern commentators have put forward slightly different versions of the harm principle such as J 
Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law - Volume 1: Harm to Others (OUP 1984), Volume 2: Offense to Others (OUP 
1985), Volume 3: Harm to Self (OUP 1986), Volume 4: Harmless Wrongdoing (OUP 1990), H L A Hart, Law, Liberty and 
Morality (Stanford University Press 1963), A P Simester and A von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: on the principles 
of criminalisation (Hart 2011) and J Gardner and S Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape” in J Gardner, Offences and Defences 
(OUP 2007).  For a summary, see J Edwards, ‘Harm Principle’ (2014) 20 Legal Theory 253. 
30 As with adherents of the ‘harm’ principle, proponents of legal moralism cover a broad range of viewpoints.  
Examples of legal moralists include P Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (OUP 1965), M S Moore, Placing Blame: a 
general theory of the criminal law (OUP 1997), S E Marshall and R A Duff, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs” (1998) 
11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 7; R A Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (OUP 2000). 
31 For example, J Gardner and S Shute, “The Wrongness of Rape” in John Gardner, Offences and Defences (OUP 
2007); and M S Moore, Placing Blame: a general theory of the criminal law (OUP 1997) and R A Duff, Punishment, 
Communication and Community (OUP 2000). 
32 For a more in depth discussion of this question, see J Stanton Ife ‘Criminalising Conduct with Special Reference 
to Potential Offences of Stirring Up Hatred Against Disabled or Transgender Persons’ in Law Commission, Hate 
Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences (Consultation Paper 213). 
33 A Ashworth and J Horder, Principles of the Criminal Law (7th edn OUP 2013) 31-35 and 52. 
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boundaries of the criminal law.  Commentators disagree as to what the proper limits of the 
criminal law should be, and various theories on criminalisation have been put forward.34 For the 
purposes of this discussion, one element from Douglas Husak’s35 theory stands out as being of 
relevance to hate crimes.  Husak puts forward several principles which should be used to 
determine the justifiability of a new law.36  One of these, is the need for the wrong that the law 
seeks to outlaw to be aimed ‘toward a substantial state interest’.37  Husak suggests that the 
‘expressive’ function38 of the law is a legitimate state interest.  The ‘expressive’ function of the 
law is to send a clear message to the community about the wrongfulness of the conduct that is 
prohibited. However, Husak argues that this expressive function can only be legitimate and 
sufficiently important in the context of hate crime laws if ‘arguments can be produced to show 
why crimes motivated by hatred are worse than those motivated by other emotions such as 
greed, or jealousy’.39   
It is necessary to consider the implications of both these principles for hate crime 
legislation.  Although both principles apply to all three hate crime statutes, this discussion will 
focus on the CDA aggravated offences for three main reasons.  Firstly, unlike the sentencing 
offences or the incitement to hatred offences, these provisions fall very clearly into the category 
of ‘overlapping’ offences that Husak identifies as being a particular characteristic of over-
criminalisation.40  This is where behaviour that is already criminal is re-criminalised under a new 
statute with a more serious punishment.  The aggravated offences essentially create new, more 
                                                          
34 For a general discussion, see A Ashworth and J Horder, Principles of the Criminal Law (7th edn OUP 2013) 31-35 and 
52 and R A Duff, L Farmer, S E Marshall, M Renzo and V Tadros, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (OUP 2010). 
For more specific theories see D Husak, Overcriminalization, (OUP 2008) and J Schonscheck, On Criminalization 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994); H Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press 1968) and 
S Kadish ‘The Crisis of Overcriminalization’  (1967) 74 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 157.  
35 D Husak, Overcriminalization (OUP 2008) 
36 For critiques of Husak’s theory see, for example, P Ramsay, ‘Overcriminalization as Vulnerable Citizenship’ 
(2010) 13 New Criminal Law Review 262 and M Gur-Ayre, ‘Comments on D Husak’s Overcriminalization’ (2010) 1 
Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 21.  See also (2009) 28 Criminal Justice Ethics for a selection of papers discussing 
Husak’s theory. 
37 D Husak, Overcriminalization (OUP 2008) 132. 
38 First put forward by J Feinberg Doing and Deserving (Princeton University Press 1970). 
39 D Husak, Overcriminalization (OUP 2008) 141. 
40 D Husak, Overcriminalization (OUP 2008) 132, 36-37 
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serious offences where the offender has committed the basic offence whilst motivated by or 
demonstrating hostility towards the victim on the grounds of race or religion.41  Given that the 
underlying conduct of the CDA provisions are already criminalised, this means that considerable 
thought needs to be given as to the justification for the existence of these additional offences.  
This will necessitate a clear articulation of the extra harm or wrong being outlawed, and, in order 
to satisfy Husak’s theory of criminalisation, to also explain why the motivation or demonstration 
of hostility is more harmful than if the conduct had been motivated by or demonstrated some 
other emotion.  A second reason why this article will focus on the CDA offences is because they 
are the hate crime provisions which have attracted the most debate in the literature.42  
Furthermore, the Law Commission has recently recommended a comprehensive review of the 
CDA to determine whether the aggravated offences should continue to exist and in what form.43  
A serious consideration of the doctrinal legitimacy of these offences is, therefore, vital as part of 
this broader discussion.  Finally, it should be noted that the CDA provisions are also the most 
widely prosecuted of our hate offences.  According to CPS data, there were 13,032 prosecutions 
in 2015/16 for racially aggravated and religiously aggravated hate crimes under the CDA 
offences.  In the same period, there was only one prosecution under the incitement offences.44  
The CDA offences are also more extensively used than the enhanced sentencing provisions.45  
Thus, it appears that whilst the CDA provisions form the bulk of our hate crime prosecutions, 
                                                          
41 The recent Court of Appeal decision in O’Leary (Michael Patrick) [2015] EWCA Crim 1306 has clarified that there 
is an overlap between the CDA offences and the sentencing provisions under the CJA.  For a discussion see A 
Owusu-Bempah and M A Walters ‘Racially aggravated offences:  when does section 145 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 apply?’ (2016) 2 Criminal Law Review 116 and R Taylor ‘the Role of the Aggravated Offences in Combating 
Hate Crime 15 Years After the Crime and Disorder Act 1998:  Time for a Change?’ (2014) 13 Contemporary Issues 
in Law 76. 
42 See for example M. Malik, "‘Racist Crime’: Racially Aggravated Offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Part 
II"(1999) 62 M.L.R. 409 and F. Brennan "Crime and Disorder Act 1998: racially motivated crime: the response of 
the criminal justice system" [1999] Crim. L.R. 17, D. Gadd, "Aggravating Racism and Elusive Motivation" (2009) 49 
Brit. J. Criminology 755; Ormerod, Commentary at [2009] Crim. L.R. 449. 
43 Law Commission Hate Crime: Should the Current Offences be Extended? (HMSO, 2014), Law Com. No.348. 
44 CPS ‘Hate Crime Report 2014/15 and 2015/16’ July 2016 
45 There is very little data on enhanced sentencing.  In fact, the UK was criticised for this in the most recent report 
by ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) ‘ECRI Report on the United Kingdom (fifth 
monitoring cycle)’ 2016, 9.  As the report points out, the assumption is that the enhanced sentencing provisions are 
under-used (p. 26)/ 
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they are also the ones which are most vulnerable to doctrinal attack, and so they require 
particular attention. 
Identifying the ‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ in hate crime legislation has been discussed by 
commentators.46  Generally speaking, the debate in this area has seen a division between on the 
one hand those who believe the justification for this greater punishment lies with the greater 
blame we can attach to the offender because of their more blameworthy mens rea and, on the 
other hand, those who believe it lies with the more serious actus reus inherent in hate crimes.  
Broadly speaking, those who categorise hate crime as more serious because of the mens rea are 
essentially arguing from a legal moralist perspective (hate crime is ‘wrong’), whilst those who 
argue that the greater blameworthiness lies in the actus reus correlate more closely with Mill’s 
‘harm’ principle (hate crime causes more ‘harm’).   
Amongst those who believe that the justification for greater punishment lies in the more 
serious mens rea of the hate crime offender, a lively debate has been sparked about what makes a 
hate crime offender’s state of mind more blameworthy.  Lawrence,47 an early advocate of hate 
crime legislation, put forward a conceptual model for understanding the essential quality of the 
more seriously criminal state of mind.  He proffered the view that it could either be the animus 
(or hatred) the offender feels towards the victim which justifies the harsher punishment, or it 
could be the fact that the offender showed bias in their selection of victim, even if this selection 
was not underpinned by a visceral or even passive hatred of the victim.48  Commentators have 
disagreed about which of these should form the proper conception of mens rea.49 However, even 
if a consensus could be reached as to whether it should be animus or bias that underpins hate 
crime legislation, the principle of minimum criminalisation as evinced by Husak would elicit the 
                                                          
46 See for example, F M Lawrence Punishing Hate:  Bias Crimes Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999) 
73-79; L Wang, ‘Recognizing opportunistic bias crimes’ (2000) 80 Boston ULR 1399. 
47 F M Lawrence Punishing Hate:  Bias Crimes Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999). 
48 F M Lawrence Punishing Hate:  Bias Crimes Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999) 29-39. 
49 F M Lawrence Punishing Hate:  Bias Crimes Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999) 73-79 who 
preferred the animus model and Wang who prefers a discriminatory selection model:  L Wang ‘Recognizing 
opportunistic bias crimes’ (2000) 80 Boston ULR 1399. 
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further question of why it is appropriate to punish more for this state of mind, given that the 
basic offence under the CDA is already a criminal offence.  In other words, why is acting out of 
animus or bias more serious than acting out of, for example, jealousy, or greed, or sadism?  
Goodall has developed (in the context of racist offences) a third category of mens rea which she 
refers to as ‘constitutive animus’.50   This defines the more blameworthy mens rea as requiring 
proof of individual moral culpability for the hostility the defendant has displayed against those of 
a different race. This is to be the key test of blame, rather than focusing only on effect, or only 
on whether the hostility was long-standing or fleeting.  The prosecution must prove either that 
the defendant intended the act to have a racist effect or that s/he showed utter disregard for 
whether it might. The ‘constitutive animus’ model comes much closer to justifying hate crime 
legislation, but even if we take constitutive animus as our base point, it is still necessary to show 
why racism is a particular heinous state of mind that deserves extra punishment.  Therefore, 
from a doctrinal point of view, in the context of the CDA provisions, even if the wrong of hate 
crime is determined as lying in the more blameworthy mens rea of the defendant, Husak’s 
minimalist approach requires an explanation for why this wrong should be punished over and 
above the underlying basic offence.  Thus, from the point of view of justifications based on 
mens rea, what is required is not only a description of what the more culpable mens rea is, but an 
explanation for why that additional mens rea should be criminalised.  
Some hate crime scholars have preferred instead to situate the justification for hate crime 
legislation in the actus reus of the offence.  Their argument is that the harm caused by hate crime 
is greater than the harm caused by offences committed without hate.51  There is a range of views 
as to what this extra harm is:  some suggest that victims of hate crime are more adversely 
affected by a crime perpetrated against them because of their race or religion than victims of 
                                                          
50 K Goodall, ‘Conceptualising “racism” in the Criminal Law’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 215. 
51 The greater harm caused by hate crimes is at the heart of Lawrence’s justification for bias crimes, see F M 
Lawrence Punishing Hate:  Bias Crimes Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999) 39, 58 and 61-63.  See also 
P Iganski, Hate Crime and the City (Policy Press 2008) ch 1 and P Iganski ‘Hate Crimes Hurt More’ (2001) 45 
American Behavioral Scientist 626. 
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more ‘ordinary’ crimes not involving such a motive; some argue that a hate crime has an impact 
beyond the direct victim, because it also affects other people who belong to that group; whilst 
others argue that hate crime has a greater impact on the whole of society than ordinary crime.52     
However, whichever categorisation of ‘harm’ is adopted, the problem with a justification 
based on greater harm is that it cannot account for the form that hate crime legislation has taken 
under the CDA.  There are two stages involved in the assessment and punishment of a 
defendant:  the trial stage (or the liability stage), and the sentencing stage.  Under basic criminal 
law principles, the point at which a defendant’s guilt is assessed is during a trial at the liability 
stage, and this part of the criminal justice process is concerned with the blameworthiness of the 
individual defendant.  Greater blameworthiness (whether of mens rea or actus reus) is reflected 
in the definition of an offence and in the greater maximum penalty.  For example, although most 
burglaries are at heart cases involving theft, the additional and separate harm present in burglary 
cases in the form of trespass to the victim’s property is reflected in the higher maximum penalty 
available for burglary in comparison to theft.53  The higher maximum penalty for burglary is 
justified by reference to the additional and separate type of harm caused in burglary cases by the 
trespass on the victim’s property; and the existence of this separate type of harm is assessed at the 
liability stage.  Meanwhile, the sentencing stage of the criminal justice process is more concerned 
with matters relating to the level of harm caused to the victim or society more generally.  For 
instance, factors which aggravate the offence of theft (such as, for example, the value of goods 
stolen) are dealt with at the sentencing stage and not the liability stage.54   
Applying this analysis to hate crimes, if we were to accept that hate fuelled incidents 
cause more harm to individual victims and/or to the communities they represent, this extra harm 
                                                          
52 See H M Hurd and M S Moore, “Punishing Hatred and Prejudice” (2004) 56 Stanford Law Review 1081,1085-
1093 for a comprehensive discussion of the different ways in which the harm caused by hate crimes has been 
categorised. 
53 Theft is punishable with up to seven years’ imprisonment (Theft Act 1968, s. 7) whilst the highest maximum 
penalty for burglary is fourteen years’ imprisonment (Theft Act 1968, s. 9(3)(a). 
54 Sentencing Council Theft Offences Definitive Guidelines (2015) 5. 
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should be dealt with at the sentencing stage and not at the liability stage.  This is because the 
harm caused by hate crimes is of the same type as that which occurs in the basic offences, but at a 
greater level because of the amplification effect of the hate.  Hence, studies which show the extra 
harm caused to victims by hate crimes might provide a good justification for punishing offenders 
more at the sentencing stage, but they do not provide a sufficient explanation for why new 
aggravated offences are required which place extra blame on the defendant at the liability stage.  
In order, therefore, for a justification of CDA-style hate crimes based on actus reus to be 
successful it must be shown that the type of harm caused by hate crimes is of a different nature to 
that of the basic offences and is not simply a case of a differing level of harm.         
To summarise, it seems, therefore, that as far as basic principles of the criminal law are 
concerned, the rationales put forward so far for the existence of CDA-like offences based on 
mens rea and actus reus are not sufficient to justify the extra punishment which these offences 
attract.  In order for these explanations to be able to fully account for the aggravated offences, 
more is needed:explanations based on mens rea must be able to explain why a particular state of 
mind should attract more punishment than other states of mind; whilst explanations based on 
actus reus must show that the harm caused is of a different type of harm to that of the underlying 
basic offences.     
 
(b) Vulnerability, Difference, Group Hatred, Disadvantage and the Principles of the 
Criminal Law 
It is apparent, therefore, from this discussion that a satisfactory explanation for the existence of 
hate crimes cannot be found simply by describing what the harm caused is or what the more 
serious state of mind is.  Instead, what is required is an explanation that can delineate the 
boundaries of the offence more accurately, and can articulate why the ‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ is one 
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that should be punished by the criminal law. This section will consider to what extent current 
explanations for hate crime victimhood correlate with these principles of the criminal law. 
An example of a theory of victimhood based on the greater actus reus caused by hate 
crimes is that propounded by Chakraborti and Garland.  They rgue that instead of putting 
identity and group membership at the heart of hate crimes, we should instead be focusing on the 
‘vulnerability’ of victims, and the problems of ‘difference’.  They wish to step away from the 
traditional notion of hate crime because it singles out some groups for protection, and creates 
hierarchies of hate.55  This sends the message that some groups are more worthy than others, and 
that hatred of some groups is more acceptable than others. They believe that the approach based 
on a ‘singular conception of identity’56 is flawed because it fails to account for crimes committed 
against victims, such as the homeless, who may not fall into the traditional core groups usually 
protected by hate crime legislation.  These groups may be marginalised, but they do not have the 
ability or impetus to make their presence felt at the policy level and so cannot gain recognition as 
a protected group..  Chakraborti and Garland are also critical of the traditional approach which 
identifies an exclusive set of victims because they believe that this ignores the way in which most 
low-level hate crimes are perpetrated.  They argue that most hate crimes are not the result of 
deep-seated hatred or prejudice, but rather are the outcome of impulsive reactions arising from 
triggers which are unique to each situation.57  They maintain that a focus on ‘vulnerability’ would 
capture more fully the incidents of hate crime perpetrated against those most at risk from 
prejudice, hatred and hostility.  This is because vulnerability ‘encapsulates the way in which many 
hate crime perpetrators view their target: as weak, defenceless, powerless or with limited capacity 
                                                          
55 N Chakraborti and J Garland, ‘Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and 
“difference”’ (2012) 16 Theoretical Criminology 499. 
56 N Chakraborti and J Garland, ‘Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and 
“difference”’ (2012) 16 Theoretical Criminology 499, 504.   
57 N Chakraborti and J Garland, ‘Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and 
“difference”’ (2012) 16 Theoretical Criminology 499, 503. 
17 
 
to resist.’58  Thus, the core of their claim is that difference can make victims vulnerable, and thus 
it is vulnerability caused by difference (as opposed to vulnerability caused by something else) that 
should determine which groups should be given protection under hate crime legislation.   
From the point of view of the doctrinal principles of the criminal law, using vulnerability 
brought about by difference is problematic given that the ‘vulnerability’ of the victim (in a broad 
sense) is already admitted as an aggravating feature in the sentencing process.  This is because it 
is recognised that the level of harm caused to a vulnerable victim is greater than that experienced 
by a non-vulnerable victim.  As was argued above, this is consistent with the purpose of 
sentencing which is to ensure that the punishment the defendant receives should reflect the level 
of harm he or she has caused.  The vulnerability of the victim does not change the nature or type 
of harm that is caused, which is why is it more appropriately dealt with at the sentencing stage 
rather than the liability stage.  A vulnerable victim of, for example, an assault, may well be more 
scared than a non-vulnerable victim, or the fact of the assault may cause more fear in other 
members of the public who share the same vulnerability as the victim, but the type of harm is the 
same harm albeit in an  amplified form.  Thus, rationales for hate crime based on the 
vulnerability of the victim caused by difference have difficulty explaining why the harm caused in 
the aggravated offences under the CDA are of a different type to the basic offences and which, 
therefore, warrants the harm to be included at the liability stage.   
By contrast, although Schweppe also supports the need for a broader, more inclusive 
concept of hate crime, her theory of victimhood emphasises the greater blameworthiness or 
mens rea present in hate crimes.  Under her approach, hate crime legislation would be flexible 
enough to allow juries to convict defendants if they believe ‘that the motivation behind the 
criminal offence was based on hostility towards the victim…because of their personal 
characteristics (or presumed characteristics)… which he or she shares with an identifiable 
                                                          
58 N Chakraborti and J Garland, ‘Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and 
“difference”’ (2012) 16 Theoretical Criminology 499, 507.  
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group.’59  Although she suggests that equality legislation would be a good starting point for 
identifying victims of hate crime, her approach would go further and impose no restrictions on 
which groups could find protection under hate crime law.  She advocates an approach like the 
one adopted in the Canadian legislation whereby a list of characteristics protected by hate crime 
legislation can be extended to include ‘any other similar factor’.60 She argues that this would 
ensure that hierarchies of hate would not be created as virtually any social group could potential 
come within the definition of a hate crime.   
By focussing on the idea of ‘group hostility’ Schweppe is closer to traditional notions of 
hate crime law as espoused, for example, by Perry.61  Schweppe attempts to explain the wrong 
caused by hate crime as the additional element of discrimination involved in the motivation of 
the offender.  However, as far as Husak’s theory of criminalization is concerned, this rationale 
for hate crime law still requires an explanation for why discrimination against a person because 
of the characteristics they share with a group is a sufficiently wrongful motivation - as opposed 
to motivations based on greed, or jealousy - to be given special attention by the law in the form 
of the aggravated offences.  Whilst Schweppe’s theory can give us a clear account of what hate 
crime legislation aims to do – punish discrimination based on group hostility – it does not give a 
normative explanation for this, particularly in the context of the principle of minimal 
criminalisation.  This is because it does not explain fully why we need to punish people for their 
discriminatory motivation, and why this motivation justifies the existence of the CDA offences 
within the principles of minimum criminalisation.   
The final theory on victim categorisation to be considered is Al-Hakim’s contention that 
hate crime victims should be based on ‘disadvantage’.62  He argues that ‘disadvantage’ is a more 
                                                          
59 J Schweppe ‘Defining characteristics and politicizing victims: A legal perspective’ (2012) 10 Journal of Hate 
Studies 173, 187. 
60 section 718.2(a)(i) of the Canadian Criminal Code 
61 B Perry In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes (Routledge 2001). 




useful way of allocating protection under hate crime legislation because it offers a better 
explanation for the link between the categories of victims commonly included in hate crime 
legislation.  He argues that other explanations such as ‘group hostility’ or ‘vulnerability’ are over-
inclusive as they do not adequately capture the wrong that hate crimes attempt to proscribe.  He 
reasons that adopting the politically neutral concept of ‘disadvantage’ that focusses on 
‘functioning’ and ‘capabilities’ handicaps63 will ensure hate crime legislation will include the 
groups in society most deserving and in need of protection.  Al-Hakim provides a cohesive and 
persuasive theorisation of the different groups that are currently included in hate crime 
legislation.  His insight that the common denominator between these groups is ‘disadvantage’ is 
very valuable.  However, much like Schweppe’s ideas on victimhood, ‘disadvantage’ can only 
take as so far in relation to the theory of minimal criminalisation, as it cannot explain why 
‘disadvantage’ should be given greater protection in the criminal law in the form of aggravated 
offences.  Al-Hakim’s theory may be helpful in determining which emerging groups ought to be 
included in hate crime legislation, but it presupposes that such protection is legitimate and fails 
to give an adequate justification for the aggravated offences. 
 Thus it can be seen that whilst there is a small but growing literature on which 
groups should be incorporated under hate crime laws, current explanations are not able to 
explain why the harm caused to the victims of hate crime warrants the existence of the CDA 
offences.  Any description of victimhood must be able to explain what the additional harm or 
more blameworthy mens rea is in order to provide a legitimate rationale for aggravated offences. 
 
(c)  Equality as the Basis for Hate Crime Offences 
                                                          
63 M Al-Hakim, ‘Making a home for the Homeless in Hate Crime Legislation’ (2014) Journal of Interpersonal 
Violence 1, 20. 
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Given the doctrinal weaknesses in the ‘vulnerability’, ‘group hostility’ and ‘disadvantage’ 
explanations for hate crime law, this section will argue that an equality-based conception of hate 
crime is able to provide a normative explanation for the criminalisation of hatred which is more 
consistent with the principles of the criminal law.   
 It is important at the outset to explain what is meant by the term ‘equality’.  ‘Equality’ has 
at times been used by commentators in the context of discussions about hate crime.  However, 
the definition used by different commentators has varied.  For example, for Perry, social and 
political inequalities are the explanation for why hate crime happens in the first place.  She 
explains that hate crime: 
“…is a means of marking both the Self and other in such a way to re-establish their ‘proper’ 
relative positions, as given and reproduced by broader ideologies and patterns of social and 
political inequality” 64 
By contrast, Harel and Parchomovsky65 put equality at the centre of their argument by positing 
that the basis of hate crime legislation is the broader societal concern for the fact that certain 
groups are more vulnerable to attack.  They argue that this means those groups need extra 
protection from the law in order to ensure equality of access to the criminal justice process.66  
Thus, Harel and Parchomovsky use ‘equality’ as a way of justifying the existence of hate crime 
rather than as an explanation for why hate crimes occur.  Like Harel and Parchomovsky, 
Lawrence also uses the broad concept of ‘equality’ as a general justification for bias crime.67  He 
says: 
                                                          
64 B Perry In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes (Routledge 2001).10. 
65 A Harel and G Parchomovsky ‘On Hate and Equality’ (1999) 109 Yale Law Journal 507. 
66 See H M Hurd and M S Moore, “Punishing Hatred and Prejudice” (2004) 56 Stanford Law Review 1081 for a 
criticism of this approach 
67 F M Lawrence Punishing Hate:  Bias Crimes Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999), 2,3, 8. 
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 “Because racial harmony and equality are among the highest values held in our society, 
crimes that violate these values should be punished more harshly than crimes that, although 
otherwise similar, do not violate these values.”68 
He takes a much broader view than Harel and Parchomovsky about what is meant by ‘equality’.  
However, this concept is not developed further in Lawrence’s book, and he chooses instead to 
focus on the greater harm caused by hate crimes to justify their existence.  This piece will build 
on Lawrence’s idea that the basis of hate crimes is the concept of equality by demonstrating that 
this core value has been enshrined in law through a vast array of equality legislation over a 
number of decades.   It will be argued that the justification for hate crimes is linked to this 
legislation:  offenders who target their violence towards groups who have already been identified 
as requiring the coercive power of the law to eradicate discrimination against them, risk 
destabilising social cohesion and perpetuating prejudices that threaten our society’s ideals.   
To begin with, in exploring the origins of hate crime legislation, the links with the 
broader equality agenda are unmistakeable.  The first attempt to legislate against hatred formed 
part of the raft of provisions contained in the Race Relations Act 1965 (hereafter ‘RRA’) which 
sought to make discrimination on the basis of race unlawful.  This Act was heralded as a 
watershed for race relations in Britain, and was introduced at a time when the pernicious effect 
and magnitude of racial discrimination had come into sharp focus following the wave of 
Caribbean and Indian immigration to this country in the 1950’s.69  The vast majority of 
provisions under the RRA 1965 were aimed at tackling the problem of racism through the civil 
law, particularly in relation to employment and the provision of services.  There was, however, 
an accompanying criminal law measure under section 6 which made it a criminal offence to incite 
racial hatred.  Subsequently, s. 6 underwent changes under s.70 of the Race Relations Act 1976 
                                                          
68 F M Lawrence Punishing Hate:  Bias Crimes Under American Law (Harvard University Press 1999), 8 
69 See G Schaffer, ‘Legislating against Hatred:  Meaning and Motive in Section Six of the Race Relations Act of 
1965’ (2014) 25 Twentieth Century British History for a history of the legislation. 
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and then again under s. 18 and s. 19 of the Public Order Act 1986, but its origins very clearly lie 
in legislation aimed directly at outlawing discrimination.     
Similarly, the aggravated offences under sections 28-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 were also introduced as a way of endorsing good race relations and clamping down on 
discrimination.70  The racially motivated offences enacted under the 1998 Act were based on 
proposals in a consultation document entitled Racial Violence and Harassment:  A Consultation 
Document71 which cites a Home Affairs Select Committee which describes racial crime ‘as the 
most shameful and dispiriting aspect of race relations in Britain’.72  This shows a clear link 
between the issue of race relations more generally and the criminal law, and paints a picture 
where racial violence is highlighted as a symptom of a much wider, social problem.    
It is clear, therefore, that s.18 and 19 of the POA, and sections 28-32 of the CDA 1998, 
were advanced as a response to increasing ethnic diversity and division in Britain, and formed 
part of the growing governmental agenda addressing issues arising from multiculturalism.  
However, since the RRA 1965, anti-discrimination provisions and the broader multiculturalism 
agenda have undergone an extensive broadening out in so far as the protected characteristics are 
concerned.  Whilst the RRA 1965 was the first of its kind and was subsequently followed by 
further race relations acts73 other movements were making political gains in parallel to those of 
race.74  For example, the gender equality movement, which had begun much earlier in the late 
19th century, was experiencing a ‘second wave’ momentum which led to the Equal Pay Act 1970, 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (which resulted in the establishment of the Equal 
Opportunities Commission) and finally the introduction of the public sector gender equality duty 
                                                          
70 F Brennan ‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998:  racially motivated crime: the response of the criminal justice system’ 
(1999) Criminal Law Review 17-28. 
71 Paragraph 2.3 in Home Office Racial Violence and Harassment:  A Consultation Document (1997) para 2.3. 
72 Racial Attacks and Harassment (Session 1985-6) HC 409 cited in Home Office Racial Violence and Harassment:  A 
Consultation Document (1997).  
73 Such as the Race Relations Act 1968 and the Race Relations Act 1976; See also Sandra Fredman, Discrimination 
Law (OUP 2011) 50-68. 
74 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (OUP 2011) Ch 2. 
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under the Equality Act 2006.    Meanwhile, the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 gave 
the gay rights movement the tools to challenge a number of laws which enabled it to achieve 
equality for sexual orientation in areas as diverse as the armed forces, adoption, succession and 
immigration.75  Groups supporting and protecting the rights of the disabled also gathered 
momentum in this period.76   
By 2010, these parallel movements had generated a number of diverse pieces of 
legislation which had been introduced in a piecemeal fashion depending on the needs of the 
individual movements and the political opportunity to have their demands recognised within the 
law.  This resulted in uneven protection being afforded to the different characteristics.  However, 
despite their disparate interests, the clear link between the competing groups was the concept of 
equality:  fundamentally all these groups were campaigning for equal recognition and status 
before the law.  More broadly, these movements formed part of a wider multicultural agenda 
which sought to bring about community cohesion and to celebrate difference.  This began with 
race, but came to include other groups who had historically found themselves disadvantaged 
politically, socially and legally.  This idea of equality as the meeting point of these interest groups 
became entrenched under the Equality Act 2010 which brought together nine protected 
characteristics77 and created a general public sector duty to eliminate unlawful discrimination, to 
advance equality of opportunity and to foster good relations between different groups.  Thus, we 
are now in a position where, broadly speaking, the nine protected characteristics enjoy equal 
protection under the law.   
Insofar as hate crime legislation is concerned, it can be seen that a similar expansion of 
the characteristics protected under the law is occurring.  Whilst the CDA and POA were 
                                                          
75 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (OUP 2011) 86-93. 
76 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (OUP 2011) 95-101. 
77 Equality Act 2010, s 4: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and 
maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation.  
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originally aimed at protecting race, these have been extended to religion and sexual orientation.78  
The Ministry of Justice’s brief to the Law Commission to consider extending all the offences to 
disability, sexual orientation and transgender fits in with this pattern of development and is 
mirroring the changes in equality law. 79  
Jacobs and Potter have traced a similar shape to the development of hate crime 
legislation in the United States and which they identify as part of the ‘identity politics’ 
movement.80  They have shown how various interest groups and minorities have gradually been 
included in hate crime legislation as their political importance has grown.   This suggests that our 
own model of development is far from unique and represents a general trend in the 
advancement of hate crime law.  Jacobs and Potter, however, are very cynical about the political 
motivation behind both the introduction of hate crime legislation and its expansion to include 
several minority groups.  They believe that crimes of hatred are a relative rarity and therefore do 
not require tailored legislation.   They argue that legislatures have opted to adopt such statutes 
anyway as a way of garnering favour with minority groups and to respond to a heightened public 
sensitivity towards prejudice.  Their concern with the use of the criminal law for such symbolic 
purposes lies in the fact that: 
‘…hate crime laws encourage citizens to think of themselves as members of identity groups and 
… as victimized and besieged… [which] contributes to the balkanization of American society, 
not its unification’.81 
Jacobs and Potter, therefore, believe that the ‘identity politics’ which hate crimes play up to has a 
pernicious effect on a cohesive society.    McLaughlin has shown how this belief forms part of a 
larger debate within American political culture about how best to achieve an ‘open society’ which 
                                                          
78 The CDA offences were extended to ‘religion’ by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s 39. The 
public order offences were extended to ‘religion’ by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, and to ‘sexual 
orientation’ by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
79 Law Commission, Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences (Consultation Paper 213). 
80 J B Jacobs and K Potter, Hate Crimes:  Criminal Law and Identity Politics (OUP 1998). 
81 J B Jacobs and K Potter, Hate Crimes:  Criminal Law and Identity Politics (OUP 1998) 131.  
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is free and equal for everyone.82  The debate centres on a disagreement about the ideal way to 
accommodate differences between people; some argue that the celebration and promotion of 
difference is the path to social cohesion, whilst others believe that drawing attention to such 
differences will ultimately exacerbate social tensions between groups.83  Jacobs and Potter are 
firmly of the opinion that highlighting difference will not solve the problem of a fragmented 
society, and this explains their reservations over the enactment of hate crime statutes.84 However, 
the types of concerns expressed by Jacobs and Potter have not held much sway in the 
multiculturalism debate in the UK where the general thrust of legislation, as evinced by the 
Equality Act 2010 and all the statutes preceding it, has been in favour of honouring difference 
and giving extra protection where necessary.   
However, it is important to note that whilst the celebration of difference can be seen as a 
shared characteristic between the various groups which have gradually gained recognition within 
the equality legislation, a much more fundamental connection between them is the fact that these 
groups have historically been oppressed in one way or another, and hence require the strong-arm 
of the law to enable them to lead free and equal lives.  This is a far more critical factor than that 
of difference because it explains why these groups have fought for recognition within the law 
rather than merely through cultural or social acceptance.  There are other interest groups which 
have sought to promote the welfare of their members both through legal and non-legal means,85 
but legal recognition has only been afforded to those groups for whom it is deemed a necessity.  
Equality lawyers have also sought to make this distinction and Solanke has argued that ‘equality 
law is designed to address oppression rather than just promote diversity’.86 As such, protected 
characteristics do not simply represent groups which are ‘different’ in some way, but rather 
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86 I Solanke, ‘Infusing the Silos in the Equality Act 2010 with Synergy’ (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 336, 353. 
26 
 
consists of groups which have also been systematically oppressed, and are at risk of unequal 
treatment within society without the added protection of the law.   
Historically speaking, it is clear that hate crimes statutes have been seen as integral parts 
of the broader equality agenda. The link between oppression and the need for legal redress has 
also been made in the context of hate crime law.  McLaughlin makes the point that the groups 
which have sought recognition under hate crime legislation are ones which are ‘…historically 
subordinated’ and have ‘…endured prejudice, harassment, and violence’.87  Perry’s well-
established definition of hate crime describes it as ‘…a mechanism of power and oppression, 
intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterise a given social order.’88  
However, as well as being of historical significance, an explanation based on equality has 
the additional advantage of being able to explain at a doctrinal level how hate crime law can be 
justified.  For scholars who prefer to explain hate crimes on the basis of the more blameworthy 
men rea, equality is able to explain why hatred of certain groups is punished more severely than 
other motives: the hostility demonstrated towards certain groups is more blameworthy because it 
undermines the equality enterprise.  From an actus reus point of view an explanation based on 
equality is able to show why hatred of specified groups causes a different type of harm to society 
that that of the underlying offence:  the harm is the damage to equality which results from 
hateful behaviour.  In this way, equality as the underlying rationale for hate crimes can serve as a 
doctrinal justification for the criminalization of hatred.  It is able to articulate clearly and 
precisely what the additional harm or wrong involved in hate crime is, and is thus able to show 
how hate crimes can be appropriately accommodated within traditional criminal law structures.  
Furthermore, an equality-based conception of hate crime is able to provide a normative 
explanation for the criminalisation of hatred which is more consistent with the doctrine of 
minimum criminalisation as espoused by Husak. As was noted above, Husak stated that in order 
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for the expressive function of hate crime legislation to be legitimate, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the hatred being outlawed by the provisions is more wrongful than other 
emotions such as jealousy or greed.  Equality is a core value of society that has been enshrined in 
law by the state.  By targeting violence towards groups who have already been identified as 
requiring the coercive power of the law to eradicate discrimination against them, hate crime 
offenders risk destabilising social cohesion and perpetuating prejudices that threaten our society’s 
ideals.  This provides a clear explanation for why hatred is singled out as a particularly heinous 
emotion, and why acts accompanied by hatred are more wrongful.   
  
 
4. Consequences of Adopting Equality Law as the basis of hate crime 
legislation 
It follows from the previous discussion that certain consequences will ensue from adopting 
equality law as the basis of hate crime legislation.   
Insofar as the question of how we should determine victimhood within hate crime legislation 
is concerned, it is clear that the protected characteristics as enunciated in the Equality Act 2010 
should form the framework for hate crime legislation.  If a characteristic has been deemed to be 
sufficiently persecuted or subjugated that it requires civil law protection under the Equality Act 
2010, then it is justifiable in principle to extend this protection through the criminal law.  
However, although inclusion of the protected characteristics in hate crime legislation is legitimate 
in such circumstances, it does not follow that it is also appropriate or necessary.  A further stage 
is required to determine whether the extra protection which results from recognition within the 
hate crime statutes is necessary.  This is important as the principle of minimum criminalisation 
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demands that a new criminal offence must only be created if necessary, and where non-legal 
methods cannot achieve the same purpose.89  The principle of equality is able to express the 
additional harm or wrong involved in hate crimes, and can, therefore, provide a reason for 
criminal sanctions and can account for the extra punishment inflicted on offenders.  However, it 
does not tell us whether criminalisation is necessary.  In the civil law, the decision whether or not 
to include certain characteristics may be based on evidence that there is discrimination in the 
workplace or in the provision of services on those grounds.  In the Criminal Law, the assessment 
of the need for extra protection will depend on any evidence that these groups are indeed 
targeted by criminals on the basis of their particular characteristic so it is still important to ask 
this further question in order to safeguard the integrity of the principle of minimum 
criminalisation.   
Viewing hate crime through the lens of equality in this way would, therefore, provide a very good 
basis for the review of the CDA offences as recommended by the Law Commission.90 Currently, 
the CDA provisions do not include sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity.  
However, if there is evidence that these groups are suffering targeted violence (and clearly there 
is), then the fact that these characteristics are covered in the equality legislation would be a prima 
facie reason for extending the CDA provisions.  This analysis would also pave the way for 
feminist groups to argue that gender should also be included within hate crime legislation.91 
An inevitable consequence of limiting the victims of hate crimes to the protected 
characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 is that some vulnerable groups, such as the homeless 
or members of the goth community, will not be covered by the legislation.  This will indeed 
create ‘hierarchies of hate’ as pointed out by some commentators, as the message will be that 
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committing crimes against certain groups will be punished more harshly than crimes against 
other groups.92  Indeed, it could be said that the equality argument creates a paradox:  if, as is 
argued here, hate crimes are about ‘equality’ how can we justify the unequal treatment of victims 
that this entails?  This is a valid question and can be addressed in three ways.   
Firstly, this issue has been dealt with in great depth in the equality literature which suggests 
that the solution may be found in the distinction between formal and substantive equality. 93  
Formal equality requires all citizens to be treated in the same way irrespective of their personal 
characteristics.  This vision of equality would not countenance the existence of hate crime laws 
for the precise reason in the question posed above – hate crime legislation applies different rules 
depending on who the victim is, and so it breaches the rules of formal equality.  However, a 
broader conception of equality which underpins modern equality legislation,94 and, as is argued in 
this piece, by implication hate crime legislation, is that of substantive equality, and more precisely 
equality of opportunity.  This substantive concept of equality recognises that historical 
discrimination means that not all groups in society have been given the same starting point, and 
so, legislation is required to even the playing field to ensure all groups are given the same 
opportunities.95  This will often require certain disadvantaged groups to be treated differently by 
the law in order to ensure equality of opportunity.  In the context of hate crime legislation, this 
concept of equality explains why hate crime law is justified in giving more protection to certain 
groups: in order to ensure the groups recognised under equality legislation enjoy the same 
opportunities as others, targeted violence against them needs to be treated more harshly.  This 
sends a clear message that this behaviour is particularly harmful to society because it undermines 
the equality of opportunity that these groups deserve and which equality legislation seeks to 
secure.   
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A second way of answering this question is to distinguish here between what is the essential 
function of hate crime legislation on the one hand, and, on the other, the inevitable operational 
benefits of being an included group.  The essential function of hate crime legislation is the 
expressive element which is the recognition of the different type of harm or wrong caused by the 
perpetrators of hate; it is a statement by society that violence targeted at protected characteristics 
is particularly harmful or wrong, and therefore worthy of greater punishment, because it 
undermines the core value of equality as enshrined in the Equality Act 2010.  The operational 
benefit of hate crime legislation is that it can increase the likelihood that the police and the CPS 
are more alert to the needs of that particular community, and means that arrests and 
prosecutions are more likely.  These operational benefits are very important, but given that 
violence against anyone is already a criminal offence, creating legislation in addition to existing 
offences would be violating the doctrine of minimum criminalisation if this were done for the 
sole purpose of drawing the police’s attention to crimes committed against certain groups96  In 
order to secure the doctrinal legitimacy of hate crimes, the inevitable consequence of this is that 
not all groups who wish to avail themselves of the operational benefits of hate crime will be able 
to be included in the legislation.   
A third issue to highlight here is the fact that the alternative option - an open, or inclusive 
category of hate crime victims – is not an attractive solution.  Firstly, concerns have been 
expressed about the potential dilution effect of hate crime legislation if it is applied to a large 
number of characteristics.97 It has been argued that dilution can happen both in terms of 
reducing the power of the message put across by the legislation that hate crimes are particularly 
heinous, but also in terms of the operational burden for the police and the CPS if their limited 
resources are spread across too many groups.  Chakraborti and Garland argue that the 
operational burden is vastly overrated, and the police and the CPS would be able to cope with 
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this.98  However, even if we set aside the operational arguments, it is still necessary to consider in 
more detail the argument relating to the dilution of the message that hate crimes communicate.  
As the law currently stands, the CDA offences treat hate crimes more severely not because we 
consider the motivation or demonstration of hostility an aggravating factor, but because we 
consider the hostility felt towards particular characteristics as an aggravating factor.  If the categories 
of victim were not specified, and instead were potentially limitless and at the discretion of the 
jury or a judge, this would fundamentally change the essence of hate crime legislation and distort 
its message.  This is because inconsistencies will inevitably creep into the law with some groups 
being given recognition under the legislation some of the time, but not at others.  These 
discrepancies will undermine the fundamental aim of hate crime legislation which is to draw 
attention to the particularly serious nature of certain behaviour; if the seriousness of the 
behaviour is left to the vagaries of discretion (whether of judges or juries), it is difficult to see 
how effective the message of hate crime can be.  It will no longer be the case that hatred against 
a group is always more serious, but rather it might be depending on whether the judge or jury 
decide it is in that particular case. 
 A corollary to the argument about hierarchies of hate is that some offenders will be 
punished more than others.  This is potentially problematic in the context of hate crimes.  Perry 
has shown how offenders of hate crime are often themselves victims of social inequality;99 and 
Lamble has noted the way in which progressive groups, such as the LGBT community which 
was once a target of police abuse, now use the politics of incarceration and policing as a way of 
furthering their movement’s goals.100  It could, therefore, be argued that punishing those who are 
themselves victims of inequality in the interests of the broader equality agenda does not make 
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sense.  The strength of this argument lies in giving us pause for thought when considering the 
best way of punishing hate crime offenders.  It may well be that this suggests that alternatives to 
imprisonment, such as restorative justice,101 should be considered in the context of hate crime.  
However, it is not an argument for avoiding the additional punishment altogether.  This would 
be akin to saying, for example, that someone who has been a victim of violence should not be 
punished for committing acts of violence themselves.  Without doubt legislating for hate crime 
will not be a panacea all for social inequality. However, recognising the harm caused by hate 
crime to social cohesion will bring us one step closer to eradicating bias and prejudice that is 
divisive and destructive. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The choice over which groups should have protection under hate crime legislation is not purely a 
political or policy-based one whereby only those with the necessary resources to bring 
themselves to the attention of the state are given recognition.  In fact, the decision is inextricably 
linked to the underlying rationale for hate crimes.  This is because the principles we use to 
determine the categories of victims reflect our core beliefs about the values at the heart of hate 
crime legislation.  Various suggestions have been put forward as to how we can determine these 
values, and subsequently how we can choose our categories of victims.  Concepts such as 
‘vulnerability’ or ‘group hostility’ or ‘disadvantage’ have been argued to be at the centre of hate 
crime legislation.   
This article argues that in order for a rationale of hate crime law to be valid, it needs to accord 
with basic principles of the criminal law.  Two such principles were considered in more detail:  
first, the need for a clear articulation of the ‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ that hate crime are designed to 
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outlaw, and secondly the need to ensure the principle of minimum criminalization is adhered to.  
It was argued that using ‘equality’ as enshrined in equality legislation not only gives a historic 
account for the development of hate crime legislation, but also provides a more principled basis 
for understanding the ‘wrong’ or ‘harm’ at the centre of hate crimes.  The concept of equality is 
better able to explain adequately Husak’s requirement that hate crime legislation must justify why 
‘hate’ is punished more severely than other emotions.  This is because it explains that the 
additional ‘harm’ or ‘wrong’ committed by perpetrators of hate crime is the destabilising of social 
cohesion and the perpetuating of prejudices that threaten our society’s ideals.   This argument 
necessarily requires the victims of hate crime to be linked to the protected characteristics under 
equality legislation, and will, therefore, result in an exclusive group of victims.  It is argued, 
however, that this will not necessarily result in unequal protection to vulnerable victims if the 
operational and expressive functions of hate crime legislation are de-coupled.   
 
 
 
 
